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Abstract 
In this paper we deal with a new approach 
to probabilistic reasoning in a logical frame­
work. Nearly almost all logics of probabil­
ity that have been proposed in the litera­
ture are based on classical two-valued logic. 
After making clear the differences between 
fuzzy logic and probability theory, here we 
propose a fuzzy logic of probability for which 
completeness results (in a probabilistic sense) 
are provided. The main idea behind this 
approach is that probability values of crisp 
propositions can be understood as truth­
values of some suitable fuzzy propositions as­
sociated to the crisp ones. Moreover, sug­
gestiotlS and examples of how to extend the 
formalism to cope with conditional probabil­
ities and with other uncertainty formalisms 
are also provided. 
1 Introduction 
Discus.'>ions about the relation between fuzzy logic and 
probability are still numerous and sometimes rather 
controversial. In particular, using fuzzy logic to rea­
son in a probabilistic way may be a priori considered 
as a "dangerous mixture" of both formalism'>. In this 
sense, the aim of this paper is twofold. First to stress 
the differences between fuzzy logic and probability the­
ory, making clear that they are different formalisms 
addressing different problems and using diffm·ent tech­
niques. Second to show how it is possible to con­
sistently use them together by proposing a new and 
meaningful approach to probabilistic reasoning based 
on fuzzy logic. The topic of relating probability and 
logic is not by far new. A number of logics of prob­
ability have been proposed in the literature, as those 
in !Scott and Kraus, 1966; Hajek and Havranek, 1978; 
Gaifman and Snir, 1982; Nilsson, 1986; BacchlL'3, 1990; 
Halpern, 1989; Wilson and Moral, 1994]. But all of 
them except for !Hajek and Havranek, 1978] are based 
on classical two-valued logic. Here we propose a propo­
sitional fuzzy logic of probability for which complete-
ness results are provided. The main idea behind this 
approach is that probability values of crisp proposi­
tions can be understood as truth-values of some suit­
able fuzzy propositiotlS associated to the crisp ones. 
Before going to the technical details in next sections, 
and in order to avoid misunderstandings, we start by 
addressing and clarifying the main notions involved in 
this paper. 
Main difference between fuzzy logic and prob­
ability theory 
In our opinion any serious discussion on the relation 
between fuzzy logic and probability must start by mak­
ing clear the basic differences. Admitting some simpli­
fication, we cotL'>ider that fuzzy logic is a logic of vague, 
imprecise notions and propositions, propositions that 
may be more or less true. Fuzzy logic is then a logic 
of partial degrees of truth. On the contrary, probabil­
ity deal'3 with crisp notimlS and propositions, proposi­
tions that are either true or false; the probability of a 
proposition is the degree of belief on the truth of that 
proposition. If we want to consider both as uncertainty 
degrees we have to stress that they represent very dif­
ferent sorts of uncertainty (Zimmermann calls them 
linguistic and stochastic uncertainty, respectively). If 
we prefer to reserve the word "uncertainty" to refer 
to degrees of belief, then clearly fuzzy logic does not 
deal with uncertainty at all. The main difference lies 
in the fact that degrees of belief are not extensional 
(truth-functional), e.g. the probability of p A q is not 
a function of the probability of p and the probabil­
ity of q, whereas degrees of truth of vague notions 
admit truth-functional approaches (although they are 
not bound to them). Formally speaking, fuzzy logic 
behaves as a many-valued logic, whereas probability 
theory can be related to a kind of two-valued modal 
logic (cf. e.g. !Hajek, 1993} or !Hajek, 1994} for more 
details, also IKiir and Folger, 19881). Thus, fuzzy logic 
is not a "poor man's probability theory", as some peo­
ple claim. 
Comparing fuzzy logic and probability 
Nevertheles.'>, relationships . between fuzzy logic and 
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probability theory have been studied. They have not 
only been compared but also combined. First of all, we 
refer to [Zadeh, 1986j; even if the title of Zadeh's pa­
per ends with the words "a negative view", he is rather 
positive in combining fuzziness and probability by sug­
gesting a definition of the probability of a fuzzy propo­
sition. Another important paper is I Dubois and Prade, 
19931, in which the authors extensively survey the lit­
erature concerning the relationship between fuzzy sets 
and probability theories; again, besides pointing out 
the gaps between them, the authors build bridges be­
tween both theories, stressing in this sense the impor­
tance of possibility theory. Our paper is an attempt 
to contribute further to this bridge building. 
Probability is ground on classical equivalence 
We restrict ourselves to propositional calculws; i.e. for­
mulas are built from propositional variables and con­
nectives (negation -., implication -+ and possibly oth­
ers. We shall consider only calculi in which other con­
nectives are definable from negation and implication. 
Formulas can be endowed with various semantics, 
among them the classical (boolean, two-valued): there 
are just two truth values 0 and 1, each evaluation e 
of propositional variables by zeros and ones extends 
uniquely to an evaluation of all formulas lL'>ing cla.<:r­
sical truth tables. Two formula.<> cp, '1/J are classic.ally 
equivalent if e( cp) e( 1/1) for any boolean evaluation 
e. The second semantics of our interest i'.l that of 
Lukasiewicz's infinite-11alued calculm: truth values are 
real numbers from the unit interval [0, lJ, and truth 
functions are 
1-x 
X-+y min(l, 1 -x + y) 
(we take the freedom of denoting a truth function 
by the same symbol as its corresponding connective). 
Under this second semantics, cp, 'lj1 are £-equivalent if 
e( cp) e( '1/J) for any real-valued Lukasiewicz evalu­
ation e. Neglecting the difference between cla.'3Sical 
and many-valued equivalence of formula.'> ha.'> been the 
source of known misunderstandings conceming fuzzy 
logic. Clearly, if two formulas are L-equivalent then 
they are cla.'3Sically equivalent, but the converse does 
not hold. 
On the other hand, a (finitely additive) probabilit11 on 
formulas is a mapping P a.<>signing to each formula 
·cp a real number P(cp) in [0, 1] preserving cla.'lsical 
equivalence (i.e. if cp, '¢1 are cla.-ssically equivalent then 
P( cp) = P( 'if;)) and satisfying the well known condi­
tions: P(true) 1, P(false) = 0, and if cpA'I/1 is cla.'.lsi­
cally equivalent to false then P(cpv.,P) = P(cp)+P(1/J). 
Here true is a classical identically true fonnula, e.g. 
p -+ p, false is -.true, cp V 1/, is ( cp -+ '1/J) -+ V' (this is 
a possible definition of disjunction from implication) 
and cp A 'I/1  is -.(-.cpv-..,P). In other word'>, a probability 
is in fact a function on the Boolean algebra of cla.-sses 
of clas<.;ically equivalent formula.'>. 
Can the probability of a formula be under­
stood as the truth degree of the same for­
mula? 
Clearly not in the truth-functional case: just because 
probabilities are not truth-functional. However this 
is possible in the non-truth functional case. Let us 
mention for instance the paper [Gerla, 1994), where the 
author exhibits an abstract, non-truth functional fuzzy 
logical system whose set of interpretations consists of 
all probabilities on the set of all formulas and presents 
a complete deductive system for this. 
Can we understand the probability of a for­
mula as the truth degree of another one 1 
Our claim is that we can when the other formula ex­
presses something like that the former one is "prob­
able". This is the heart of our approach. Probabil­
ity preserves classical equivalence and therefore "un­
derstands" formulas as crisp propositions. But prob­
ability is just a variable (like pressure, temperature, 
etc.) and we may make fuzzy assertions on it: if cp is 
any formula we may say "cp is probable' or "probabil­
ity_of-'P is high", and these are typical fuzzy proposi­
tions. Such approach was suggested in !Hajek and Har­
mancova, 1994]; fuzzy propositions about probabilities 
are also disclL'3Sed in !Zimmermann, 19911. Our aim is 
to describe a fuzzy theory in the frame of the truth­
functional Lukasiewicz-Pavelka's logic which naturally 
relates to probability theory. Notice that our approach 
will clearly distinguish between propositiono:; like "(l? 
is probable) and ('1/1 is probable)" on the one hand and 
"(cp A 1/1) i'.l probable" in the other. 
Fuzzy theories and their logic 
Following Pavelka [Pavelka, 19791, we define a fu.zzy 
theory to be just a fuzzy set of formulas: if T is a fuzzy 
theory and T( cp) = x (denoting that the membership 
degree of cp to T is x) then cp is an axiom to the degree 
x. Semantics is given by a set Sem of fuzzy sets of 
formula.'>; each element M of Semis understood as an 
interpretation of the language, i.e. M ( cp) = x is read 
as "cp is true in M to the degree x". M is a model of 
T if for any cp, M(cp) ;::: T(cp), i.e. each formula is at 
leMt as much true in Mas the T-degree of axiomness 
demand'>. 
· 
lu a truth-functional approach, Sem is the set of all 
evaluations of formulas obtained from evaluations of 
propositional variables by means of some particular 
truth functions, e.g. the Lukasiewicz truth functions 
-,..., above mentioned. But let us stress that other 
choices which lead to non-truth functional systems are 
also possible. In any case one should try to exhibit 
some notion of proof and try to prove some complete­
ness result. 
The paper is organized as follows. After this intro­
duction we survey in Section 2 the Rational Pavelka's 
Logic- a generalization of Lukasiewicz's logic discov­
ered by Pavelka and simplified by Hajek. In Section 3 
we present our fuzzy theory of probability and prove a 
completeness result. In Section 4 we comment on pos­
sible extensions and uses of the proposed approach. 
Finally, Section 5 contains some discussion on open 
problems and concluding remarks. 
2 Rational Pavelka's Logic 
Lukasiewicz's infinitely-valued logic only allows us to 
prove !-tautologies, but in fuzzy logic we are interested 
in inference from partially true assumptions, admitting 
that the conclusion will also be partially true. Rational 
Pavelka's Logic RP L is an extension of Lukasiewicz's 
infinitely-valued logic admitting graded formulas and 
graded proofs. It is described in a simple formalization 
in [Hajek, 1995j. Since the approach described in this 
paper strongly relies on this logic, here we present the 
main notions and properties of it. 
2.1 Formulas are built from propositional variables 
Pl,P2, . . . and truth constants r for each mtional r E 
[0, 1J using connectives -+ and ...,, Other connectives 
are defined from these ones. In particular, among oth­
ers, Pavelka defines two conjunctions and two disjunc­
t�ons exactly as in Lukasiewicz's logic, i.e. 
cp&'f/1 
cpY.1/J 
cpV1/J 
cp/\1/J 
cp+-+1/J 
stand<> for 
stand<> for 
stand<> for 
stands for 
stands for 
-,( cp -+ ...,t/1) 
-,cp -+ t/1 
( cp -+ 'f/1) -+ 1/1 
-,( -,cp v ...,1{1) 
( cp -+ t/1) 1\ ( 1{1 -+ cp) 
Taking into account the Lukasiewicz's truth functions 
corresponding to -+ and -,, it is easy to check that 
the truth functions for the above connectives are the 
following ones: 
r& s 
= 
rY.s 
rVs 
rl\s 
r+-+s 
max(O, r + s- 1) 
min(r + s, 1) 
max(r, s) 
min(r, s) 
min(1- r + s, 1- s + r) 
An evaluation of atoms is now a mapping of atomic 
propositions into [0, 1 J. Such mappings extend 
uniquely to an evaluation of all formulas respecting 
the above truth functions. 
A gmded formula is a pair ( cp, r) where cp is a formula 
and r E [0, lJ is rational. Such a formula is understood 
as saying that "the truth value of cp is at least r". 
Logical axioms are: 
(i) axioms of Lukasiewicz's logic (all in degree 1) 
cp-+ ( 1{1-+ cp) 
(cp- 1{1)- ((t/1- x)-+ (cp -+ x)) 
(-,cp-+ -,'lj1)-+ (1/1-+ cp) 
((cp-+ 1/1)-+ 1/1)-+ (('1/1-+ cp)-+ cp) 
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(ii) bookkeeping axioms: (for arbitrary rational r, s E 
[0, 11): 
r in degree r' 
-,r +-+ -,'f in degree 1, 
r -+ s +-+ (r -+ s) in degree 1. 1 
Deduction rules are: 
(i) modus ponens: from (cp, r) and (cp-+ 1/J,s) derive 
(1/l,r&s) 
(ii) truth constant introduction: from (cp, s) derive 
(r-+ cp, r-+ s). 
We define a gmded proof from a fuzzy theory T as a 
sequence of graded formulas 
(cpt. r1), · · · , (cpn, rn) 
such that for each i, (cpi> ri) is either a logical axiom 
(i.e. cpi is a logical axiom in degree ri) or ( cpi, ri) is 
an axiom of T (i.e. T(cpi) = ri) or (cpi, ri) follows 
from some previous member(s) of the sequence by a 
deduction rule. We say that T proves cp in degree r, 
denoted T 1- (cp, r), if there is a graded proof from 
T whose last element is {cp, r). The provability degree 
of cp inT is l cp lr = sup{r I T 1- (cp, r)}. The truth 
degree  of cp in T is llcpllr = inf{e(cp) I e evaluation, e 
model ofT}. Notice that both llcpllr and l cp lr may be irrational. 
2.2 Completeness theorem for RPL. For each T 
and cp, 
I cp lr = llcpllr 
i.e. the provability degree equals to the truth degree. 
3 A fuzzy logic of probability 
In this section we are going to define a fuzzy theory in 
RP L, that we shall call F P, directly related to prob­
ability theory. We start with a set of propositional 
variables p, q, . . .  and the set of all propositional for­
mula.<> built from them. Since we shall be interested in 
probabilities of these formulas, and hence in classical 
equivalence, we shall only use for them one conjunction 
and one disjunction, say 1\ and V. We call these for­
mula.<> crisp formulas. As suggested in [Hajek and Har­
mancova, 19941, we associate with each crisp formula 
cpa new propositional variable f'i', which will be read 
as "cp is PROBABLE", or "PROBABILITY_OF_cp 
is HIGH''. This is understood as a fuzzy proposi­
tion, and given a probability P, we are free to define 
e(f 'i' ) = P(cp), i.e. assign the probability value P(cp) 
a.<> the truth-value of f'i'. We may call the variables of 
the form f 'i' fuzzy propositional variables and they will 
be taken as the propositional· variables of our fuzzy 
theory FP. Next we precisely define the FP theory 
and show it is probabilistically meaningful. 
1 Examples of bookkeeping axioms: for r = 0.4 and s = 
0.3 we get 0.6 +-+ -,0.4 and 0.9 +-+ (0,4 -+ 0.3). 
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3.1 Syntax of F P.F P-formulas are just RPL­
formulas built from fuzzy propositional variables, i.e. 
formulas built from variables of the form f"' using con­
nectives. The Axioms of F P are those of RP L (see 
above) plus: 
{FP1) {!"', 1) for cp being an axiom of classical propo­
sitional logic {the obvious three schemes), 
{FP2) {!"'_."'-+ (!"'-+ fv,), 1) for all cp, 1/1, 
(FP3) (f -.cp +-+ -.J 'P• 1) for each cp, and 
(FP4) (/cpv,p +-+ ({!"'-+ f<pi\,P)-+ /,p], 1) for each cp, 1/J. 
Notice that (FP3) and (FP4) axioms are direct trans­
lations of two of the well-known axioms of probabil­
ity, namely the relationship between the probability 
of one proposition and its negation and the finitely 
additivity property. Axioms {F P1) and {F P2) guar­
antee the preservation of cla.'>Sical equivalence and the 
monotonicity as it is proved in the next lemma and 
corollary. 
3.2 Lemma. If cp is a boolean tautology (i.e. provable 
in boolean propositional calculw;;) then FP proves fcp 
in degree 1. 
3.3. Corollary. For any "crisp" formula."! cp and 1/' 
we have: 
(1) If cp -+ 1/J is a boolean tautology then F P proves 
f cp -+ f ,p in degree 1. 
{2) Hence if cp +-+ 1/J is a boolean tautology then F P 
proves f"' +-+ f ,p in degree 1. 
{3) F P  proves /cpAtJI-+ !"' in degree 1. 
Next we show that F P has exactly the intended se­
mantics , that is, models of F P are defined by proba­
bility functions on the set of crisp formula."!. 
3.4 Theorem. An evaluation e of atomic F P­
formulas is a model of the theory F P if, and only if, the 
mapping P defined on crisp formulas by P(cp).= e{f"') 
is a finitely additive probability on crisp formula."!. 
Proof. 
(1) Let e be a model of F P  and define P(cp) = e(f"') 
for all cp. If cp is classically equivalent to 1/1 then F P f­
(f"' +-+ f,p, 1) by {2) of Corollary 3.3, hence e(fcp +-+ 
f,p) = 1, e{f"') = e(f,p) and therefore P(cp) = P('l/1); 
thus P preserves logical equivalence. Clearly, F P f­
Utrue, 1) and F P f- (-.!Jalse, 1), hence P(true) = 1 
and P(false) = 0. Also P(-,cp) = -.P(cp) is clear from 
{FP3). Now take arbitrary cp, 1/J and put a = P(cp V 
1/J), b = P(cp), c = P('lj1), d = P(cp A 1/1). By {FP4), 
a = (b -+ d) -+ c and b � d (by Corollary 3.3); thus 
a = {1 - b + d) -+ c. Now 1/' -+ (cp -+ (cp 1\ 1/1)) 
is a Boolean tautology, hence F P f- (f ,p -+ {!"' -+ 
!"'1\",), 1) and hence c = e(Jv,) ::; e(f"' -+ !<pAt/,) = 
1-b+d; thlL"' a= (1-b+d)-+ c = 1-(1-b+d) + c  = 
b + c -d. Thus P is a probability. 
{2) Conversely, assume that P is a probability on crisp 
formulas and put e{f"') = P(cp). We verify that e 
assigns 1 to each axiom of F P. Clearly, if cp is an 
axiom of classical logic then cp is a Boolean tautology 
and hence e{f"') = P(cp) = 1. This verifies {FP1). To 
verify (F P2) we show P(cp-+ 1/J) ::; (P(cp) -+ P('l{J)). 
Put now P( cp 1\ 1/J) = a, P( cp 1\ -.'ljJ) = b, P( -.cp 1\ 1/J) = 
c, P( -.cp 1\ -.1/J) = d; then P( cp -+ 1/J) = 1 - b, whereas 
(P(cp) -+ P('l{J) = 1- (a + b) + (a + c) = 1 - b + c � 
P(cp-+ 1/J) as desired. Under the present meaning of 
a, b, c, d we have e{fcpv,p) = P(r.p V .,P) =a+ b + c, and 
e((J"' -+ f<pi\,P) -+ f,p) = ((a + b) -+ a) -+ (a + c) = 
(1 - b) -+ (a + c) = a +  b + c. This verifies (FP4); 
(FP3) is evident. 0 
In [Hajek and Harmancova, 1994] the authors raised 
the question whether it could be pos."'ible for a fuzzy 
theory to have an axiomatization probabilistically 
complete in some sense. Here we give a positive an­
swer. 
3.5 Definition. A fuzzy theory T is stronger than F P 
if for each formula ci> in the language of F P, T( ci>) � 
F P(cl>) (i.e. all the axioms {FP1) ... {FP4) get the 
value 1 in T). A probability P on crisp formulas is a 
model ofT if the corresponding evaluation ep of atoms 
of FP, defined as ep(J"') = P(cp), is a model ofT. 
3.6 Corollary. LetT be a fuzzy theory stronger than 
F P. Then, for each FP-formula cl>,  
I ci> lr= inf { e p ( ci>) I P probability, P model of T}. 
This follows directly from completeness of RP L and 
from theorem 3.4. 
3. 7 Corollary. (Probabilistic Completeness for 
F P) In particular, for each crisp formula cp, 
I!"' lr= inf{P(cp) I P probability, P model ofT}, 
1- I f-.,"' lr= sup{P(cp) I P probability, P model ofT}. 
This result tells lL"' that if T f- (f 'P• r) then for every 
probability P which is a model ofT, P(r.p) � r; and 
also that if T If (f "'' r) (i.e. there is no T-proof of 
r.p to the degree r) then for each r' > r there exists 
a probability P which is a model of T and such that 
P(cp) < r'. 
3.8 Remarks. Axioms {FPl) and (FP2) could be 
replaced by other two (less elegant) axioms, namely 
by: 
(FPl') Utrue1 1) , and 
(FP2') (f'l' -+ f,p, 1), for any cp and 1/J such that r.p-+ 1/J 
is a boolean tautology. 
Notice that (F P2') is a direct expression of the mono­
tonicity of probability measures with respect to set 
inclusion. Notice also that (FP4) may be replaced in 
turn by the following axiom: 
(FP4') ((f<pV1/J--+ f'P) ..._. (f.t/,--+ /<p/\1/J), 1) 
which is another equivalent expression for the additiv­
ity property. As a final remark, let us mention also 
that in F P is not obvious how to represent statements 
about strict lower or upper bounds of probability. 
3.9 Example. We present here an example of a proof 
in F P, in particular we show how to prove that f"' .,... 
(!"'"1/J Y.. '"'"-.1/J) is a theorem of FP, corresponding 
to the well known property of probability functions 
stating that P( cp) = P( cp 1\ 1/J) + P( cp 1\ ..,1/J). Clearly, 
FP 1- (f<p ...... /(<p/\1/J)V(<p/\-ot/J)• 1); 
by (FP 4), writing cp1 for cp 1\ 1/J and cpO for cp 1\ ..,1/J, w�;; 
get the following chain of deductions: 
FP 1-
FP 1-
FP 1-
FP 1-
FP 1-
FP 1-
(/<p!V<pO ..._. ({f<pl--+ f<pll\<pO)--+ /'Po), 1), 
(f<pll\<pO ..._. 0, 1}, 
((/<pi--+ f<pt/\<pO) ..._...,,<pi, 1), 
(/<piV<pO ..._. (-,f<pl--+ f<po), 1), 
{f!fllVcpO ..._.(/If'! '::f_/cpo), 1) , 
(!If' ...... (/cp/\t/1 Y.. f'f'/\-ot/1), 1) 
This completes the example. 
4 Possible extensions 
The approach described so far is suitable for further 
developing at least along two main stream<>. On the 
one hand, we obviously need to extend RP L with 
new connectives if we want to deal with conditional 
probabilities. This is addressed in subsection (a). On 
the other hand, the proposed approach can be easily 
adapted to cope with other uncertainty models, the 
main point being to replace the characteristic axioms 
of probability theory in F P by the corresponding ax­
ioms characterizing other uncertainty models. As a 
matter of example, we shall provide in subsection (b) 
the fuzzy theory F N corresponding to Possibility The­
ory and prove its completeness. 
(a) Dealing with conditional probabilities 
The first idea in extending the framework presented in 
the previous section to deal with conditional probabil­
ities is to look for the possibility of expressing con­
ditional probabilitiy values as truth-values of fuzzy 
formulas, just as it has done in Section 3 for uncon­
ditional probabilities. Obviou<>ly, to do so, we need 
to introduce new connectives in the language, ® and 
®--+, corresponding to the product conjunction and its 
residuated implication (division) respectively. Then, 
for instance, P( 1/1 I cp) 2: a could be expressed as (!"' 
®--+ f'f'"t/1• a} . This approach has technical problems 
due to the lack of continuity of the truth function as­
sociated to ®--+ (see section 5). However, assuming 
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that P(cp) > 0, one can always express the inequal­
ity P('I/J I cp) 2: a as P(cp 1\ 1/J) 2: aP(cp). Therefore, 
as a first step, we can focus on extending the Rational 
Pavelka's Logic with only the new conjunction connec­
tive®, having the product as its corresponding truth 
function. This is done below by defining the fuzzy 
theory RP L +, the extension of RP L, as follows. 
4.1 Syntax. Formulas of RPL+ are built as in RPL, 
just adding the connective ® to the language. Logical 
axioms of RP L + are those of RP L plus 
- monotonicity: 
(cp--+ 1/J)--+ ((cp ® x)--+ (1/J ® x)) 
( cp --+ 1/J) --+ ( (x ® cp) - (x ® 1/J)) 
- bookeeping: 
r®s.,...rxs 
all of them in degree 1. 
This extension can be proved to be complete w.r.t. the 
above semantics, that is, the following theorem holds. 
4.2 Completeness theorem for RP L +. For each 
theory T and formula cp of RP L +, 
I cp lr = II'PIIT, 
i.e. in RP L + the provability degree also equals to the 
truth degree. 
Now we are ready to define the probabilistic fuzzy the­
ory F p+ analogously to F P, just by replacing the ax­
ioms of RP L by those of RP L +. In the language of 
F p+ we are actually able to express statements about 
conditional probabilities by means of formulas like 
(a® f"' --+ f If'""'' 1) 
expressing that the conditional probability of 1/J given 
cp is not smaller than a, provided that the probability 
of cp is known to be greater than 0. This is formalized 
by next theorem. 
4.3 Theorem. Let T be a theory stronger than F p+ 
and let cp a crisp proposition such that I cp lr > 0. Then 
I a ® f"' --+ f "'""' lr = 1 if and only if, for each proba­
bility P which is a model of T, it is the case that 
P(1/1 I cp) 2: a. 
Proof If I a® !If' --+ f'f'"t/1 lr = 1 then by completeness 
we have that ep(a ® !If' --+ '"'"1/J) = 1 for any prob­
ability P model of T, i.e. a ·  P(cp) � P(cp A 1/J), and 
hence P('I/J I cp) 2: a, provided that P(cp) > 0, but this 
is guaranteed by having I cp lr > 0.0 
Moreover, statements about conditional independence 
saying that for instance cp and 1/J are independent given 
x could be also expressed by means of axioms extend­
ing FP+ as 
((/rp"t/l"x ® fx).,... (!1/J"x ® '"'"x), 1) 
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Further results about the probabilistic completeness of 
F p+ will deserve future attention. 
(b) A fuzzy logic for possibility theory 
As an example of the fact that fuzzy logic is also a suit­
able framework to describe other uncertainty models 
different from probability theory, we present below the 
fuzzy theory FPS to reason with formulas valued with 
possibility and necessity degrees. Possibility theory, as 
uncertainty model, has been widely developed from a 
logical point of view under the so-called Possibilistic 
Logic (see e.g. [Dubois et al., 1994] for an extensive 
survey). Possibilistic logic obviously does not need the 
whole machinery we are going to use, but nevertheless 
we still think it can be interesting for exemplifying pur­
poses. Thus, now we are interested in associating to 
each crisp formula cp a  fuzzy formula'"'' which will be 
read as "cp is NECESSARY" or "cp is CERTAIN", 
in such a way that the truth-degree off"' represents the 
necessity degree (in the sense of necessity measures) of 
cp, and therefore the truth degree of •I �I(J represents 
the possibility degree of cp. 
4.4 Syntax of FPS. FPS-forrrmlas are jtL"it FP­
formulas, i.e. formulas built from fuzzy propositional 
variables of the form /"' using connnectives. Axioms 
of FPS are those of RPL (see section 3) plus: 
(FPS1) (fi(J, 1) for cp being an axiom of classical propo­
sitional logic, ( = (FP1)) 
(FPS2) (fi(J-+1/>--+ (fi(J--+ /11,), 1) for all cp, V', ( = (FP2)) 
(FPS3) (•ftalse, 1), and 
(FPS4) ((fi(J /\ /1/>) <-+ fi(JA1/'• 1). 
Notice that, if we denote •f�I(J by gi(J, we would get 
dual axioms corresponding to possibility measures, in 
particular (FPS1) and (FPS3) are also valid for propo­
sitional variables of type gi(J, and (FPS4) would be 
equivalently expressed as 
(FPS4') ((gi(J V g11,) <-+ 91(JV'I/'• 1) 
Caution: Note that the obvious analogon of (FPS2) 
for possibilities is not sound. 
Analogous results to those for F P can be proved for 
FPS. 
4.5 Lemma. For any "crisp" formulas cp and '1/J we 
have: 
(1) If cp is a boolean tautology (i.e. provable in boolean 
propositional calcullL'>) then FPS proves /"' in degree 
1. 
(2) If cp is a boolean antitautology (i.e. •cp is provable 
in boolean propositional calculus) then F P S proves 
•fi(J in degree 1. 
(3) If cp --+1/J is a boolean tautology then FPS proves 
fi(J - /.p in degree 1. 
(4) If cp <-+ 1/J  is a boolean tautology then FPS proves 
fi(J <-+ /.p in degree 1. 
4.6 Theorem. An evaluation e of atomic FPS­
formulas is a model of the theory F P S iff the map­
ping N defined on crisp formulas by N(cp) = e(fi(J) is 
a necessity measure on crisp formulas, i.e. N(True) = 
1, N(False) = 0 and N(cp /\ 1/J) = min(N(cp), N('lj;)). 
Proof. 
We only prove that if Nis a necessity on crisp formulas 
then the evaluation defined as e(/I(J) = N(cp) assigns 1 
to axiom (FPS 2). The rest is straightforward. Thus, 
we have to prove that Nec(cp - 1/J) ::; (Nec(cp) -
Nec('I/J)). By cases: 
- if N cc( cp) ::; N ec( 1/J) it is trivial. 
- suppose then that Nec(cp) > Nec('I/J). Since 
Ncc('I/J) = min(Nec('lj;Vcp), Nec('I/JV•cp) and Nec('lj;V 
cp) � N ec( cp) > N ec( 1/J) the only possibility is that 
Ncc('I/J) = Nec('lj; V •cp), and therefore (Nec(cp) -
Nec('I/J)) � Nec('I/J) = Nec('I/J V •cp), which ends the 
proof.D 
4. 7 Definition. A fuzzy theory T is stronger than 
F P S if for each formula <I> in the language of F P S, 
T(<I>) � FPS(<I>) (i.e. all the axioms (FPS 1); .. . 
(FPS 4) get the value 1 in T). A necessity function N 
on crisp formulas is a model ofT if the corresponding 
evaluation CN of atoms of FPS defined as eN(/I(J) = 
N(cp) is a model ofT. 
The completeness result for FPS, analogous again to 
that for F P is given in the following theorem. 
4.8 Theorem. Let T be a fuzzy theory stronger than 
FPS. Then, for each FPS-formula <I>, 
I <I> lr= inf{eN(<I>) IN necessity, N model ofT}. 
In particular, for each crisp formula cp we have: 
I fi(J lr= inf{N(cp) I N necessity, N model ofT}. 
Notice that the well-known possibilistic resolution 
principle for necessity valued clauses, saying that from 
"N(cp v 1/J) � o1" and "N(•cp V x) � o2" 
it can be inferrred 
"N('I/J v x) � o1 "o2", 
is now a derivable inference rule in FPS. Namely, 
since [(cp v V')" (•cp v x)] - (1/J v x) is a boolean tau­
tology, by lemma 4.5(3), FPS proves !(I(JV1/I)A(�I(Jvx)­
!1/>vx with degree 1. By (FPS4), F P proves also 
(/"'v"' /\ f�I(Jvx) - /.pvx with degree 1: �ow the 
proof easily comes by modus ponens takmg mto ac­
count that the completeness of RP L allows us to 
infer (f cpv.p 1\ f �cpvx, a1 1\ 012) from (f cpv.p, at ) and 
(f�cpvx, 012). 
5 Conclusions and open problems 
In this paper we have been concerned about stress­
ing the conceptual differences between fuzzy logic and 
probability, and we have shown, as a main result, that 
both notions can be consistently used together to de­
fine a fuzzy theory F P in the Rational Pavelka's Logic 
(an extension of Lukasiewicz's logic with truth con­
stants and graded proofs) which is closely related to 
probability theory. The ba<>ic approach ha'> been: the 
probability of a crisp formula cp is understood a'> the 
truth degree of the fuzzy atomic proposition f cp saying 
that "cp is probable". ModeL'> of F P are in one-to-one 
relation to probabilities on the set of crisp formula'>; 
graded proofs of f cp in a fuzzy theory T containing F P 
give lower (and upper) bounds of P(cp) for all proba­
bilities P that are models ofT. This is hoped to con­
tribute to the understanding of the relation of fuzzy 
logic and probability. Moreover we have also sketched 
two interesting extensions of this approach. In the first 
one we show the possibility of dealing with conditional 
probabilities inside the same framework by extending 
Rational Pavelka's Logic with the product conjunc­
tion connective. In the second one we have shown the 
possibility of adapting the proposed approach to cope 
with other uncertainty calculi, in particular this ha'> 
been done for Possibility theory. Remaining issues to 
be addressed are, among others: 
- a more elegant way of representing conditional proba­
bilities by means of the product residuated implication 
and try to solve the problems related to the fact that 
this implication is not continuolL'> and hence does not 
admit a Pavelka-style completeness theorem; 
- axiomatization of a fuzzy theory related to belief 
functions. To this respect, it seem'> suitable to in­
troduce in the language some modalities if we want to 
avoid having very cumbersome axioms corresponding 
to the sub-additivity properties of belief functions. 
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